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I. INTRODUCTION
The title of this article is "North Carolina and The Genius of the
Common Law." When we hear the word "genius," we usually think of an
extraordinary person like Albert Einstein or Pablo Picasso. And, indeed, the
dictionary definition of "genius" is "a person endowed with transcendent
mental superiority, inventiveness, and ability."' So, the title may have led
you to think that this Article would be about the legal equivalent of Einstein
or Picasso. Maybe Sir William Blackstone, who published his influential
four-volume Commentaries on the Laws of England in 1765-1769. Or John
Marshall, the great Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court from
1801 to 1835. Or Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the "great dissenter," who
served thirty years on the United States Supreme Court (1902-1932), after
serving twenty years on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. But no,
that's not what this Article is about, although all those lawyers had important
things to say about the common law.
When I said earlier that the dictionary definition of "genius" is an
extraordinary person, I should have said that that is one of the dictionary
* William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law.
A.B. 1969, Oberlin College; J.D. 1974, M.A. 1975, Ph.D. (history) 1977, Harvard University.
This Article is based on the Keynote Address at the Inaugural CLE Program hosted by the
North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts for the NC Appellate Practice Division,
August 22, 2017.
1. Genius, WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 946 (1971).
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definitions of the word. Another dictionary definition of "genius," and
indeed a definition that gets prior billing, is a "peculiar, distinctive, or
identifying character: essential nature or spirit ... ."2 Close readers of the
North Carolina Constitution may recognize this use of the word. It appears
in the Declaration of Rights, Article I, Section 34 on Perpetuities and
monopolies: "Perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free
state and shall not be allowed."3 That Section goes all the way back to the
state's first constitution in 1776.4
I've always found it interesting that the drafters of our first constitution
thought that the problem with perpetuities (property interests that the law
permits to exist indefinitely) and monopolies (laws allowing only one
supplier of a particular good or service) was that they threatened the essential
character of a free state. I think today we can all see how perpetuities and
especially monopolies threaten the operation of a free market. But the North
Carolina framers were not primarily worried about threats to the free market.
Instead, they were worried about threats posed by what today we would call
"crony capitalism," how the politically well-connected can amass great
wealth and preserve it for the benefit of their families for generations. That
can endanger a free state.'
But "genius" is not the only problematic word in my title. The meaning
of "common law" also poses a problem. It's a phrase we often use and never
define-rather like Mark Twain's definition of a "classic": "a book which
people praise and don't read."6  Black's Law Dictionary gives a pretty
standard definition of "common law": "The body of law derived from
judicial decisions, rather than from statutes or constitutions; caselaw"-
caselaw, that is, as opposed to statute law.7 It's worth pausing to consider
just how law is made by judges in their decisions of individual cases. Of
course, the primary function of judicial decision-making is to resolve
disputes between individuals, or between the state and an individual. Once
a decision is rendered and all appeals are exhausted, the matter is settled.
2. Id.
3. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 34.
4. N.C. CONST. of 1776, Decl. of Rights § 23 ("That perpetuities and monopolies are
contrary to the genius of a free State and ought not to be allowed."); N.C. CONST. of 1868, art.
1, § 31 ("Perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free state and ought not
to be allowed.").
5. See generally John V. Orth, Allowing Perpetuities in North Carolina, 31 CAMPBELL
L. REV. 399 (2009) (discussing Brown Bros. Harriman Trust Co. v. Benson, 688 S.E.2d 752
(N.C. Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 698 S.E.2d (N.C. 2010)); see also John V. Orth, Recent
Developments in North Carolina Property Law: Where's The Supreme Court of North
Carolina?, 95 N.C. L. REv. 1561, 1582-89 (2017).
6. DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 109 (Bergen Evans ed. 1968).
7. Common Law, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
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The same parties cannot litigate the same dispute over again. This may be
called the resjudicata effect of a judicial decision. The Latin phrase means
"a thing adjudged"--settled finally, once and for all. But those lawyers not
involved in the particular case pass pretty quickly over who won and lost.
That's because judicial decision-making has another effect-at least in
our system-precedent-setting. Having solved a problem once, there's no
reason to have to solve it again the next time it arises. Better to stand by the
prior decision. The Latin name for this is stare decisis. This is where
caselaw comes from. In the course of deciding a particular dispute, a judge
lays down a rule for how similar disputes will be resolved in the future.
"Like cases should be decided alike" is a fundamental rule ofjustice. Every
parent knows just how basic this concept is. Children instinctively appeal to
it when they say, "You let him do it!" Of course, we often respond: "It's not
the same thing!" or "You're not like him!"-the common law art of
distinguishing cases.
But Black's Law Dictionary also offers another definition of "common
law": "The body of law based on the English legal system, as distinct from
a civil law system; the general Anglo-American system of legal concepts,
together with the techniques of applying them.... ."8 The common law
cannot simply be reduced to the "body of law derived from judicial
decisions" or caselaw. In fact, the relation between caselaw and statute law
is far more complicated than it seems (we'll come back to this later). The
common law also means a body of law and a set of techniques in a particular
historical tradition, the English legal tradition, as distinct from another legal
tradition, the civil law system.
11. THE ENGLISH LEGAL TRADITION
Ordinarily when American lawyers talk about "civil law," they mean
the law concerning private rights-property, torts, contracts-as opposed to
criminal law, the law concerning public wrongs, offenses against the state.
But in the definition we just read, "civil law" means something altogether
different: it means the legal tradition based on Roman law, specifically on
the compilation of Roman law made in the fifth century A.D. by order of the
Emperor Justinian, the Corpus Juris Civilis.9 Civil law in that sense forms
the basis of the legal systems of all European countries except England. 10 It
is also, for historical reasons, the basis of the legal systems of Scotland,
8. Id.
9. Civil Law, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
10. Id.
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
Quebec, Louisiana, Puerto Rico, and the countries of Latin America."1 To
oversimplify the difference between the common law and the civil law
systems, you can say that the civil law system does not recognize caselaw,
only statute law. 12 Although one can learn a lot about the common law by
stepping outside and looking at it from the point of view of a "civilian," as
lawyers in the civil law tradition are called, this is not the place to do it; nor
am I the person to do it, being myself a common law lawyer.
The English legal tradition, from which North Carolina got its common
law system, goes back hundreds of years. A few years ago, we celebrated
the eight-hundredth anniversary of Magna Carta. In 1215, a group of heroic
barons, "sword in hand"-as Alexander Hamilton put it in the Federalist
Papers-vindicated English liberty against the would-be tyrant, King John,
forcing him to accept Magna Carta ("the great charter"). 13 Of the many
provisions (called chapters) in Magna Carta, the most important was chapter
39, which may be translated from the original Latin as: "No free man is to
be arrested, or imprisoned, or disseised, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any way
destroyed, nor will we go against him, nor will we send against him, save by
the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land."14 Students of the
North Carolina Constitution may recognize some of these phrases. In 1776
they were put in the state's Declaration of Rights. They're still there, in
Article I, Section 19: "No person shall be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of
his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner
deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the land."15 In
1970 a second sentence, guaranteeing equal protection and prohibiting
discrimination, was added. 16
11. Id.
12. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PEREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW
TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA (4th
ed. 2018).
13. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 534 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright
ed., 1961); see also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *123.
14. MAGNA CARTA OF 1215 ch. 39, reprinted in DAVID CARPENTER, MAGNA CARTA 52-
53 (2015).
15. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19; seeN.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, §17 ("No person ought to be
taken, imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled,
or in any manner deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the land."); N.C.
CONST. of 1776, Decl. of Rights § 12 ("That no freeman ought to be taken, imprisoned, or
disseized of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed or exiled, or in any manner
destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the law of the land."). See
generally John V. Orth, The Past is Never Dead: Magna Carta in North Carolina, 94 N.C. L.
REV. 1635 (2016).
16. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19 ("No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws;
nor shall any person be subjected to discrimination by the State because of race, color,
religion, or national origin."); see JoHN V. ORTH & PAUL MARTIN NEWBY, THE NORTH
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For present purposes, the thing I want to emphasize about the famous
chapter 39 of Magna Carta-in addition to the fact that it's still the law in
North Carolina over eight hundred years later-is that it invokes the "law of
the land," the common law. The barons didn't make that law, neither did the
King. In fact, at the time of Magna Carta, there were very few things that
we would call statutes. Instead, the common law was made-or, as they
would have said at the time, was discovered-piece by piece as the judges
went about their business of deciding individual cases.
The judges built the common law out of the customs common to all the
English people; that's why it's called the common law. Notice that it grew
from the ground up, so to speak; it didn't come from the Emperor or King
down. In other words, there was always a certain democratic element in the
common law. But the judges did not uncritically adopt just any custom as
common law-as shown by a story found in the earliest printed book on
English law, Sir Thomas Littleton's short treatise on the law of real property
called Tenures published in 1481.'1 Anyway, Littleton described the case of
a manor in which it was the custom for the lord to seize cattle that strayed onto
his land and hold them until their owner paid the lord whatever amount he
assessed for the damage. 18 The judges recognized that this would make the
lord ajudge in his own case and open the door for abuse. 9 As Littleton pointed
out: "[1If he had damages but to the value of a halfpenny, he might assess and
have therefore 100 pounds, which should be against reason."20 That was not
a good custom-it was "against reason"--and therefore the judges did not
accept it as part of the common law.
One more story from long ago and far away: A legal argument in an
English case from the year 1345 is preserved in the Year Books, very early
law reports (also, by the way, in French).2 At that time, the law of real
property was still being developed, and the question presented was the very
fundamental question, whether a remainder after a life estate was a valid
future interest.22 The barrister for the remainderman had found a case from
thirty years earlier in which the court had accepted the validity of such an
CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION 68 (2d ed. 2013) (describing the state's equal protection
clause as based on the Fourteenth Amendment and the state's nondiscrimination clause as
based on federal civil rights legislation).
17. LITTLETON'S TENURES IN ENGLISH § 212 (Eugene Wambaugh ed., 1985) (1481).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 561 (5th ed.
1956).
22. Id.
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interest.2 3 So he rather condescendingly told the judges that he knew what
they would do in his case: "[Y]ou will do as others have done in the same
case, or else we do not know what the law is."'24 In other words, he told the
judges that they had no choice but to rule for his client; they were bound by
precedent.2 5 One of the judges apparently didn't like the lawyer's tone and
snapped: "[The law] is the will of the justices."2 6 In other words, the law is
what we say it is. Another judge, seemingly wanting to calm things down,
quickly added: "No, law is reason."27
III. THE COMMON LAW CROSSES THE ATLANTIC
Precedent, will, reason-where do we look for law? This brief
exchange raises two questions that continue to trouble the common law to
the present day. First, is a precedent law pure and simple? Or is it only a
particular example of a broader legal principle? In other words, is the reason
behind the rule, the real rule? The second question raised by this exchange
is: What is the role of the judge's individual will in judicial decision-making?
To put it in modem terms: What about activistjudges, disregarding precedent
and striking out in a new direction? Should a judge ever change the law to
make it better in his or her eyes? Or is that judge simply a legislator wearing
a black robe? These questions help to explain why Black's second definition
of common law describes it not just as a body of law but also as a whole
"system of legal concepts, together with the techniques of applying them."28
How did the common law-this bundle of laws, concepts, and
techniques-cross the Atlantic and become American? In North Carolina,
as in the other British colonies in North America, it came with the colonists
and was applied by the colonial governments.29 But how did it cross the
legal divide created by the American Revolution and become not just an
English legal system but-as Black's says-an Anglo-American legal
system?3 We should never forget what a break the Revolution caused in
legal authority. Colonial officials in North Carolina had served as agents of
the British Empire. Once the colonies left the Empire, by what authority did
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See id
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Common Law, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
29. William E. Nelson, Politicizing the Courts and Undermining the Law: A Legal
History of Colonial North Carolina, 1660-1775, 88 N.C. L. REv. 2133, 2137-38 (2010); see
generally id at 2133-97 (discussing the operation of the common law prior to independence).
30. Common Law, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
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their officials serve? In 1787 Justice Samuel Ashe of North Carolina, who
had lived through the Revolution and helped draft the first North Carolina
constitution, explained what the break with Britain meant in Bayard v.
Singleton: "[A]t the time of our separation from Great Britain, we were
thrown into a similar situation with a set of people shipwrecked and cast on
a maroon'd island-without laws, without magistrates, without government,
or any legal authority.1 31 The governments of the former British colonies-
now independent states-had to be built on a new basis: popular sovereignty.
As the North Carolina Constitution says-in phrases dating back to 1776:
"All political power is vested in and derived from the people; all government
of right originates from the people, is founded upon their will only, and is
instituted solely for the good of the whole.1
32
The people who made the Revolution were not in revolt against the
common law. In 1774, the Continental Congress expressly laid claim to the
rights of life, liberty, and property, and the common law of England.33 In
fact, the colonists argued that in many respects they were more faithful to the
common law than the English themselves. What the colonists fought for was
a purer common law. When Thomas Jefferson reported to the Virginia
General Assembly on the project to draft laws for the new state, he explained:
"The plan of the revisal was this[:] The common law of England, by which
is meant, that part of the English law which was anterior to the date of the
oldest statutes extant"-in other words, even before Magna Carta--"is made
the basis of the work."34 Jefferson continued: "It was thought dangerous to
attempt to reduce [the common law] to a text: it was therefore left to be
collected from the usual monuments of it"35-that is, the cases.
The danger in writing down the common law was that reducing it to
writing was contrary to its most basic technique: reasoning from case to case
and testing the results by posing hypothetical cases. Confining it to a text
31. Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. 5, 6, 1 Mart. 42, 43 (1787). Samuel Ashe had been a
member of the committee of the Fifth Provincial Congress in 1776 that drafted the North
Carolina Declaration of Rights and Constitution. Minutes of the Provincial Congress of North
Carolina, in 10 COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 913, 918 (William Saunders ed.,
1890).
32. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 2; see also N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 2 ("That all political
power is vested in, and derived from the people; all government of right originates from the
people, is founded upon their will only, and is instituted solely for the good of the whole.");
N.C. CONST. of 1776, Decl. of Rights § 1 ("That all political power is vested in, and derived
from, the people only.").
33. LIBRARY OF CONG., JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789 67-69
(1904).
34. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 137 (William Peden ed.,
1954).
35. Id.
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was contrary, you might say, to its genius. As Oliver Wendell Holmes put it
in his book on the Common Law: "The truth is, that the law is .... forever
adopting new principles from life at one end, and it always retains old ones
from history at the other, which have not yet been absorbed or sloughed off.
It will become entirely consistent only when it ceases to grow. "36
North Carolina's reaction to independence was similar to Virginia's. In
1778-as soon, in other words, as practicable after the Revolution-the
General Assembly passed a common law reception statute.37 It's still in the
General Statutes, now at section 4-1: Common law declared to be in force.
All such parts of the common law as were heretofore in force and use within
this State, or so much of the common law as is not destructive of, or
repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the freedom and independence of this
State and the form of government therein established, and which has not been
otherwise provided for in whole or in part, not abrogated, repealed, or
become obsolete, are hereby declared to be in full force within this State.38
What exactly was sloughed off was left to the judges in their decisions
of particular cases. In 1991, our Supreme Court held that the common law's
year-and-a-day rule-by which an act causing death cannot be prosecuted as
homicide if the victim dies more than a year and a day after the act was
committed-had become obsolete, even though it had been accepted as part
of the received common law for two centuries.39
The effect of General Statutes section 4-1 was described by the North
Carolina Supreme Court in 1971 in Steelman v. City of New Bern: "That
statute adopted the common law of England as of the date of the signing of
the Declaration of Independence. 40  To that extent, Sir William
Blackstone's four-volume Commentaries on the Laws of England would
prove to be a very useful reference. As the United States Supreme Court
repeated just a few years ago: Blackstone was "the preeminent authority on
English law for the founding generation."'" The first volume of Blackstone's
Commentaries appeared in 1765, the very year of the Stamp Act crisis, and
affirmed that the common law extended to the colonies (although he later
36. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 36 (1881).
37. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 4-1 (2017).
38. Id.
39. State v. Vance, 403 S.E.2d 495, 498-99 (N.C. 1991); see also 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 197-98.
40. Steelman v. City of New Bern, 184 S.E.2d 239, 241 (N.C. 1971).
41. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 593-94 (2008) (citing Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999)).
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qualified that).42 The Commentaries were widely read by lawyers in colonial
North Carolina, and later formed the basis of legal education in this state.43
But like so many statements concerning the common law, the North
Carolina Supreme Court's statement in Steelman was only a first
approximation. About twenty-five years later, Chief Justice Burley Mitchell
qualified it in Gwathmey v. North Carolina: "[T]he statement... is correct
only if it is understood to mean that the 'common law' to be applied in North
Carolina is the common law of England to the extent it was in force and use
within this State at the time of the Declaration of Independence .... "44 As
you see, the common law had taken on a life of its own in colonial North
Carolina.
The question in Gwathmey was whether the state had title to lands
covered by water. 45 The common law of England had an answer to that: the
sovereign owned lands under water that was subject to the ebb and flow of
the tide.46 Given England's geography, this was a convenient way to
describe navigable waters. But in the colony of North Carolina, that rule of
thumb was not very helpful. An early state judge described it as "entirely
inapplicable to our situation," given the great length of our rivers, which
extend far into the interior.47 "By that rule," he said, "Albemarle and
Pamlico sounds, which are inland seas, would not be deemed navigable
waters, and would be the subject of private property."48 Another judge
added: "There can be no essential difference for the purposes of navigation,
whether the water be salt or fresh, or whether the tides regularly flow and
ebb or not."49  So the judges restated the ebb-and-flow test as a test of
navigability in fact. The principle behind the precedent was what mattered.
The reason behind the rule was the real rule.
This idea had a venerable pedigree in the common law. Lord
Mansfield, Chief Justice of the English Court of King's Bench, had said as
42. See THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL HISTORY 363 (Markus D. Dubber &
Christopher Tomlins eds., 2018).
43. John V. Orth, Blackstone's Ghost: Law and Legal Education in North Carolina, in
RE-INTERPRETING BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: A SEMINAL TEXT N NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 125, 127-29 (Wilfrid Prest ed., 2014).
44. Gwathmey v. State ex rel. Dep't of Env't, Health, & Nat. Res., 464 S.E.2d 674, 679
(N.C. 1995).
45. Id. at 678-79.
46. See Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 456-60 (1851)
(discussing the common law rule by the United States Supreme Court and its rejection as
applied to American conditions).
47. Wilson v. Forbes, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 30, 34-35 (1828).
48. Id. at 35.
49. Id. at 38.
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much in a case decided on the eve of the American Revolution: "[P]recedent,
though it be evidence of law, is not law in itself; much less the whole of the
law."5 And Justice Joseph Story, in a celebrated decision of the United
States Supreme Court construing the Federal Judiciary Act, even denied that
caselaw is real law: "In the ordinary use of language it will hardly be
contended that the decisions of Courts constitute laws. They are, at most,
only evidence of what the laws are .... ,,51 North Carolina Justice Richmond
Pearson agreed: "Let a case be taken, as settling the law, primafacie; but if
it is shown, not to be supported by principle and 'the reason of the thing,' let
it be over-ruled. 52
IV. RENOVATING THE COMMON LAW
In the decades after the Revolution, judges throughout the country were
busy renovating the common law to suit American conditions. Britain was
a small island that had been inhabited for millennia. Much of its landscape
had been remade over the years and parceled out among private landowners,
some of them great lords. England had a monarchy, an aristocracy, a landed
gentry, and an established Church. The conditions in America, both
geographic and social, were very different.
In an 1829 case, Justice Joseph Story announced what had by then
become obvious: "The common law of England is not to be taken in all
respects to be that of America."53 The particular issue in the case was the
ownership of items of personal property that a tenant had attached to rented
land. 4 Under the common law, whatever was affixed to land became land
and belonged to the landlord.55 Justice Story recognized that this rule would
penalize commercial tenants and inhibit economic development, something
that would be very undesirable in a developing country like the United
States.56 So he restated the common law of fixtures; or, rather, he changed
its substance, while keeping its form-another characteristic technique of
common law development.57 An item of personal property affixed by a
commercial tenant in furtherance of a trade or business was a fixture, but a
special kind of fixture---one that belonged to the tenant rather than to the
50. Jones v. Randall (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 706, 707.
51. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
52. Gaskill v. King, 34 N.C. 211,223, 12 Ired. 201, 213 (1851) (Pearson, J., dissenting).
53. Van Ness v. Pacard, 27 U.S. (1 Pet.) 137, 144 (1829).
54. Id. at 138.
55. Id. at 143.
56. See id at 146.
57. See id. at 138-49.
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landlord, if it could be removed before the end of the term without permanent
damage to the leased property. 58 In what sense, other than the name, was
this still a fixture?
Perhaps without intending it, Justice Story's decision on trade fixtures
began the slow-motion process of common law change. Judging from the
latest Restatement of the Law of Landlord and Tenant, it may be the case
today that what Justice Story held concerning trade fixtures-that a
commercial tenant could remove them--may now be true of all fixtures,
including ordinary items of personal property affixed by a non-commercial,
residential tenant. 59 Of course, the justification for allowing the removal of
non-trade fixtures cannot be the same as the justification for allowing the
removal of trade fixtures. Affixing ordinary items of personal property to
residential tenancies does not have the same pro-developmental effect. But
maybe the real reason for the exception is that tenants-all tenants, not just
commercial tenants-should not be penalized for suiting the property to their
own use (whether commercial or residential) if it would do no harm to the
landlord. The trade-fixtures exception may be in the process of "swallowing
the rule."
Something similar happened with the law of waste. Originally, waste
was any physical change to a freehold made by anyone with an interest less
than a fee (tenants for a term or tenants for life).60 It gave the owner of the
future interest (landlord, reversioner, or remainderman) the right to an
injunction and damages, and in extreme cases resulted in the forfeiture of the
lesser estate. 61 But what if the changes actually improved the freehold?
Perhaps the principle behind the rule was not to protect the holder of the
future interest against any change, but to protect against changes that caused
harm to the freehold. Too restrictive a law of waste, like too restrictive a law
of fixtures, could inhibit a tenant from making useful improvements.
Viewed in this light, changes by a tenant did not seem to merit the
intervention of equity or the award of damages, let alone forfeiture of the
estate. Still, it was a change and therefore, under traditional law, still
58. See Tenant's Fixture, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004); Trade Fixture,
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) ("Despite its name, a trade fixture is not usu. treated
as a fixture-that is, as irremovable.").
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP. § 12.2(4) (AM. LAW INST. 1977) ("Except to the
extent the parties to a lease validly agree otherwise, the tenant is entitled to remove
permissible annexations he has made to the leased property, including agricultural crops, if
the leased property can be and is restored to its former condition after the removal . . .
60. See Waste, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
61. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-538 (2017) ("In all cases of waste, when judgment is against
the defendant, the court may give judgment for treble the amount of the damages assessed by
the jury, and also that the plaintiff recover the place wasted, if the damages are not paid on or
before a day to be named in the judgment.").
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technically waste. So a new category of waste had to be recognized:
ameliorating waste. This was waste that did not trigger the remedies for
ordinary waste. In other words, it was waste that was not waste.62 By
attaching a fancy Latin adjective, the superficial consistency of the law could
be maintained while preventing the noneconomic consequences.
The problem of suiting the common law to America was bigger than
the law of fixtures or waste. As Justice Story elsewhere admitted: "[T]he
common law was an utter stranger to the principles of commercial
jurisprudence ... ."63 "Almost all the principles, that regulate our
commercial concerns," he said, "are of modem growth, and have been
ingrafted into the old stock of the law."'  A commercial republic needed
commercial law, and fast. The common law judges went to work.
As judicial renovation and extension of the common law picked up
speed, people began to realize that the courts were doing a lot more than
decision-making; they were also doing some pretty significant law-making.
What about the constitutional principle of separation of powers? From 1776
to the present, the North Carolina Constitution has provided that "[t]he
legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of the State government
shall be forever separate and distinct from each other."65 How to square this
with the developing caselaw? One could say that making caselaw was a
delegated legislative function. Or that the power to set precedents, at least in
a common law system, was a necessary included power in the general grant of
judicial power. A more direct attempt to deal with judicial law-making, by the
way, was to move to an elected judiciary. If the judges are exercising the
people's sovereign legislative power, they should at least be directly
accountable to the people. North Carolina made the move to popular election
in its 1868 constitution.66
Of course, it was already clear at the time of the Revolution that a statute
trumps the common law. On Blackstone's list of ten canons of statutory
62. See Waste, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) ("[A]meliorating waste [is a]
lessee's unauthorized change to the physical character of a lessor's property-technically
constituting waste, but in fact resulting in improvement of the property. Generally, equity
will not enjoin such waste.").
63. Joseph Story, Growth of the Commercial Law, in MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF
JOSEPH STORY 269 (William W. Story ed., 1852).
64. Id. at 272.
65. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 6; see also N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 8 ("The legislative,
executive, and supreme judicial powers of the government ought to be forever separate and
distinct from each other."); N.C. CONST. of 1776, Decl. of Rights § 4 ("That the legislative,
executive, and supreme judicial powers of government, ought to be forever separate and
distinct from each other.").
66. See generally John V. Orth, Tuesday, February 11, 1868: The Day North Carolina
Chose Direct Election of Judges, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1825 (1992).
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construction, Number 7 was: "Where the common law and a statute differ,
the common law gives place to the statute .... The legislative power
includes the power not just to make statute law, but also to unmake caselaw.
North Carolina's General Statutes section 4-1 is to the same effect. In 1987,
the General Assembly decided to abolish the centuries-old common law rule
of real property known as the Rule in Shelley's Case.68 This is what the
statute says: "The rule of property known as the rule in Shelley's case is
abolished."
69
Something similar happened with another old common law rule, the
Rule in Dumpor's Case-a rule even more obscure than the Rule in Shelley's
Case. In 2012 the General Assembly added the following section to the
General Statutes: "The rule of property known as the Rule in Dumpor's case
is abolished."7 Because rights may have vested under the respective rules
during the preceding centuries, both repeals were prospective only. Statutory
change is like that: prospective only, especially if there could have been
reliance on the prior law. It may be constitutionally required.
Notice that the statutes that abolished the Rule in Shelley's Case and
the Rule in Dumpor's Case don't state the Rules; they just abolish them-
whatever they are. The definitions are incorporated by reference to the
common law. Lawyers trained in the civil law system of continental Europe
would be shocked that a statute failed to define its essential term. But
lawyers trained in the common law system find nothing unusual about it.
The common law is always there in the background.
Even in the field of criminal law, the common law still has a role to
play, at least in states like North Carolina that retain common law crimes.
To this day, there is no statutory definition of murder or assault in the General
Statutes. 7 As to the crimes of burglary and arson, the substantive offences
67. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *89.
68. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-6.3 (2017); see generally John V. Orth, Requiem for the Rule
in Shelley's Case, 67 N.C. L. REv. 681 (1989).
69. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-6.3.
70. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-6.4 (2017); see generally John V. Orth, North Carolina Bids
Goodbye (Again) to the Rule in Dumpor's Case, 35 CAMPBELL L. Ruv. 193 (2013).
71. There is no statutory definition of murder. See State v. Crawford, 406 S.E.2d 579,
587 (N.C. 1991) ("[M]urder is not defined by the statute .... "); State v. Vance, 403 S.E.2d
495, 501 (N.C. 1991) ("N.C.G.S. § 14-17 does not define the crime of murder .. "); State
v. Beale, 376 S.E.2d 1, 2 (N.C. 1989) ("Murder under N.C.G.S. § 14-17 is murder as defined
at common law."); State v. Monroe, 756 S.E.2d 376, 381 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014), aff'd per
curiam, 768 S.E.2d 292 (N.C. 2015) ("Murder is a crime, defined as at common law.").
Likewise, there is no statutory definition of assault. See State v. Floyd, 794 S.E.2d 460, 464
(N.C. 2016); State v. Mitchell, 592 S.E.2d 543, 547 (N.C. 2004); State v. Roberts, 155 S.E.2d
303, 305 (N.C. 1967) ("There is no statutory definition of assault in North Carolina and the
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remain "as defined at the common law."7 2  Here the common law is
incorporated by reference-not to abolish but to affirm. Whatever the
elements of the offenses were at common law, they still are. It might be
difficult to pin them down in a statute. Perhaps, as Jefferson said, it might
even be "dangerous" to reduce them to a text. Something might be left out,
leaving an opening for a criminal to escape.
The interaction between caselaw and statute is even more complicated
than that. In 1973, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, the oldest
court in continuous existence in the Western Hemisphere, confronted the
question whether a wife has a claim for loss of consortium arising from
injury to her husband caused by the negligence of a third party.73 Clear
precedent in Massachusetts, well-rooted in the common law, indicated the
answer was no. Just two years earlier, a divided Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court had stood by the rule and indicated that any change should be
made by the legislature, not by the court. But then there was a change of
personnel on the court-or maybe the judges just lost patience with the
legislative process-and they overruled the recent precedent, allowing the
action to proceed.
As explained by Justice Benjamin Kaplan, a former Harvard Law School
professor, who had just been appointed: "In a field long left to the common
law, change may well come about by the same medium of development. 74
That is, the judges had made this rule in the first place, so they could change
it. Could there be an echo here of the medieval debate about whether judges
are bound to "do as others have done in the same case?" Or can they exercise
their reason (or is it their will?) and do something else? 75
Let me pick up with Justice Kaplan's opinion: "Indeed," he said, "the
Legislature may rationally prefer to act, if it acts at all, after rather than
before the common law has fulfilled itself in its own way."' 76 In other words,
the interaction between legislation and precedent works in both directions:
crime of assault is governed by common law rules"); see also In re B.C.D., 629 S.E.2d 617,
619 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) ("The offense of assault has no statutorily prescribed definition.").
72. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-51, 58 (2017); see also State v. Bond, 478 S.E.2d 163, 174
(N.C. 1996) ("Robbery, a common law offense not defined by statute in North Carolina, is an
aggravated form of larceny.").
73. Lombardo v. D. F. Frangioso & Co., 269 N.E.2d 836, 836 (Mass. 1971).
74. Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 302 N.E.2d 555, 563 (Mass. 1973).
75. I ask this without intending any criticism of the result--only in recognition that
overruling precedent, that is, changing caselaw, is yet another of the common law's
"techniques."
76. Diaz, 302 N.E.2d at 563. Justice Kaplan could have been thinking about the line in
Alfred Lord Tennyson's poem, Mort d'Arthur: "The old order changeth, yielding place to
new, And God fulfils Himself in many ways, Lest one good custom should corrupt the world."
Alfred, Lord Tennyson, Mort d'Arthur, POETRY FOUND., https://perma.cc/44NA-A2EM.
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the legislature may change caselaw and the judiciary may prompt a change
in legislation. As an example, Justice Kaplan cited the response of the
Massachusetts General Court (the legislature) to the Supreme Judicial
Court's 1969 forecast of the abolition of charitable immunity in tort, another
judge-made rule.77
Charitable immunity has an interesting history in North Carolina. In
1967, the state Supreme Court confronted the question. Although charitable
immunity was being criticized in the literature and had been rejected by some
courts, North Carolina and many other states-including Massachusetts at
the time-had not yet taken this step.7 After much soul-searching, Justice
Susie Sharp (as she then was) led a narrow majority of the justices to hold
that "the rule of charitable immunity can no longer properly be applied to
hospitals. 79 In private correspondence, she confessed that in order to get
Justice Joseph Branch to cast the deciding judicial vote, 80 she had to add that
the holding was prospective only: "The rule of liability herein announced
applies only to this case and to those causes of action arising after January 20,
1967, the filing date of this opinion." 81 (Looks a lot like legislation, doesn't
it?) Prompted by the court, the General Assembly acted to abolish charitable
immunity, effective September 1, 1967.82 Actually, the statute went even
further than the caselaw and abolished charitable immunity in general, not only
as applied to hospitals.83
Sometimes in our federal system the signal for legislative change is sent.
by long distance. In 1970, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia decided to abandon the centuries-old common law conception
of the lease as a conveyance, at least insofar as residential leases are
concerned, and adopt the "civil law" concept of the lease as a contract.
84
According to Judge J. Skelly Wright, speaking for the court,
"leases... should be interpreted and construed like any other contract." 85
Since contracts for the sale of consumer goods now include an implied
77. Diaz, 302 N.E.2d at 563 n.44.
78. See Rabon v. Rowan Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 152 S.E.2d 485, 496-98 (N.C. 1967)
(reviewing cases in other jurisdictions).
79. Id. at 499.
80. ANNA R. HAYES, WITHOUT PRECEDENT: THE LIFE OF SUSIE MARSHALL SHARP 285
(2008).
81. Rabon, 152 S.E.2d at 499.
82. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.9 (2017).
83. Id.
84. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
("The civil law has always viewed the lease as a contract, and in our judgment that perspective
has proved superior to that of the common law.").
85. Id. at 1075.
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warranty of fitness for use, residential leases should be interpreted to include
a corresponding warranty of habitability.86 That decision triggered a
nationwide rethinking of traditional law on landlord and tenant-a
rethinking that has still not reached a final conclusion. Although many state
courts followed Judge Wright's lead, other courts, including in North
Carolina, hesitated, awaiting legislation. And in 1977, the North Carolina
General Assembly adopted the Residential Rental Agreements Act.87 Two
years later, it was followed with the Retaliatory Eviction Act,88 echoing
another decision of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, also authored
by Judge Wright.89 In this case, the statute law in one jurisdiction followed
the caselaw in another.
Earlier,9' I mentioned that in Gwathmey, the case concerning title to
lands covered by navigable waters, our Supreme Court explained that North
Carolina had received the common law of England as of the Fourth of July
1776, but only "to the extent that it was in force and use within this State at
the time."'" I want to return to Gwathmey for something else Chief Justice
Mitchell said in that case. After reciting-in words reminiscent of
Blackstone---that the common law must yield to statute law, he added an
exception: "except that any parts of the common law which are incorporated
in our Constitution may be modified only by proper constitutional
amendment."92 I don't know exactly what parts of the common law the chief
justice had in mind, and he may have been simply avoiding-in good
common law fashion-a statement more sweeping than it had to be.
Chief Justice Mitchell's words remind us that at the time of the
American Revolution the common law was seen as a bulwark of individual
rights against executive power. Indeed, in the days before the first
constitutions were drafted and adopted, Americans thought of the common
law as the source of their rights, and many of the procedural protections now
enumerated in the North Carolina Declaration of Rights began as common
law practices. The ban on ex post facto laws in Article I, Section 16, and the
guarantee of the writ of habeas corpus in Article I, Section 21, would be
useless unless we knew what they were.93 The privilege against self-
86. Id. at 1077. See also U.C.C. §§ 2-314 to -315 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N
1977) (discussing implied warranties in contracts for the sale of goods).
87. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 42-38 to -44 (2017).
88. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-37.1 (2017).
89. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969).
90. See supra text accompanying notes 44-50.
91. Gwathmey v. State ex rel. Dep't of Env't, Health, & Nat. Res., 464 S.E.2d 674, 679
(N.C. 1995).
92. Id.
93. SeeN.C. CoNST. art. 1, §§ 16, 21.
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incrimination in Article I, Section 23 began as a common law rule. 94 It is an
interesting thought that although a statute trumps the common law, some
parts of the common law, now incorporated in the constitution, trump a
statute.
V. THE COMMON LAW & THE CONSTITUTION
When in 1776 the first written constitutions appeared, the common law
was already six hundred years old, and the courts had to pause and take a
deep breath before they could sort out the relationship among caselaw,
statute law, and constitutional law. The key question, of course, was whether
the constitution was just another statute, subject to repeal by the legislature.
In North Carolina, that question was answered within a dozen years of the
Revolution. In Bayard v. Singleton,95 the case in which Justice Ashe
explained the legal effect of American Independence, the Court of
Conference (the predecessor of our Supreme Court) held that the General
Assembly did not have the power by simple majority vote to make an
exception to the constitution: "[N]o act [the legislature] could pass, could by
any means repeal or alter the constitution[.]"'  As every law student knows,
Chief Justice John Marshall reached the same conclusion a few years later in
Marbury v. Madison: "[An] act of legislature, repugnant to the constitution,
is void"--that is, is no law.97 And as Chief Justice Mitchell pointed out, the
sort of super-law that is the constitution may be modified only by
constitutional amendment. 98
But another question remained: How should a constitution be
construed? The common law had centuries of experience in reading written
documents-contracts, deeds, and wills. And Blackstone provided a
complete set of rules for statutory construction.99 But were written
constitutions to be read the same way? The answer seems to be yes and no.
There is always the undeniable logic of "original intent": a document means
what those who executed it meant at the time-no more, no less. There's an
old common law rule: where a writing has a plain meaning, no further inquiry
is required or allowed. But another notable line from John Marshall suggests
something different, at least as regards certain constitutional provisions:
94. See N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 23.
95. Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. 5, 6, 1 Mart. 42, 43 (1787).
96. Id. at 7, 1 Mart. at 45.
97. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
98. Id.
99. See John V. Orth, Blackstone's Rules for the Construction of Statutes, in
BLACKSTONE AND HIS COMMENTARIES: BIOGRAPHY, LAW, HISTORY 79 (Wilfrid Prest ed.,
2009).
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"[W]e must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding."'' "° I
don't pretend to know just what he meant by that. It's usually interpreted to
mean that the words should be given a (shall we say) generous construction.
That's certainly what Marshall did when he wrote the line in McCulloch v.
Maryland, construing the Necessary and Proper Clause to empower
Congress to create a national bank. He was adopting Alexander Hamilton's
definition of the word "necessary." "[N]ecessary," Hamilton said, "often
means no more than needful, requisite, incidental, useful, or conducive
to."'' That definition is not what you would find in any non-legal
dictionary. This infuriated Jefferson who said Marshall had turned the
Necessary and Proper Clause into what he called the "sweeping clause,"
making just about any congressional action constitutional. 02
I spoke earlier about the interaction between caselaw and statute law.' 03
There's also an interaction between common law and constitutional law. We
noticed how statutory and constitutional drafters alike use common law
terms and rely on the common law for definitions and context. But I think
there is another and little-noticed interaction between common law-at least
the customs and techniques of common law-and constitutional law. I think
courts treat some constitutional provisions more like precedents than like
statutes-finding a principle behind the rule that is the real rule.
In a lecture I gave a few years ago at the United States Supreme Court
Historical Society, I suggested that the complicated-indeed,
contradictory-jurisprudence that has accumulated over the last two
centuries concerning the Eleventh Amendment may be best explained just
that way. " The Eleventh Amendment, usually covered in the course on
Federal Jurisdiction, deprives federal courts of jurisdiction over certain suits
against states: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State."'0 5 Over the centuries, the United States Supreme
Court has discerned the principle behind the Amendment to be recognition
100. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (italics in original).
101. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 30 (1993)
(citing Hamilton's 1791 Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank); see
also 6 DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON & HIS TIME: THE SAGE OF MONTICELLO 352 (1981)
(stating that Marshall had discovered Hamilton's opinion among the papers of President
Washington).
102. 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 501 (rev. ed.
1926).
103. See supra text accompanying notes 67-7 1.
104. John V. Orth, The Judicial Amendment, 37 J. SuP. CT. HIST. 125 (2012).
105. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
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of state sovereign immunity and developed a line of precedents extending
the rule far beyond the words of the Amendment. Like other lines of
common law precedents, this one, too, has encountered competing rules, and
the extension of the principle of state sovereign immunity has been limited
by the need to reconcile it with the imperative of the Supremacy Clause.
That's a long and complicated story. I wrote a book on that topic thirty years
ago that examines the story in depth. 
106
For present purposes, substantive due process provides a more
accessible example. In this case, the reason behind the guarantee of due
process has been identified as protection against unreasonable government
interference with private rights. As explained by the second Justice John
Marshall Harlan: "Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its
content cannot be determined by reference to any code .... It is a rational
continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial
arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints .... .-107
The difficulty of determining exactly what is arbitrary and purposeless
is the source of considerable disagreement, as we all know. To literal readers
of the constitutional texts, some decisions-particularly in the area of the
right to privacy in sexual matters-seem remote from the bare words "due
process," as indeed they are. They can be justified, if at all, only by
demonstrating that they are the latest link in a line of cases developing the
concept of limited government. The test of the soundness of the latest due
process decision must be-like the test of the latest decision in any line of
cases developing a precedent-whether the linkages from case to case are
reasonably sound and whether competing interests are adequately
accommodated.
CONCLUSION
Finally, I must return to the place where I started and try to answer the
question: What is the genius of the common law? I don't mean the wisdom
of the common law, although I think it does embody a lot of practical
wisdom. I mean the distinctive character or essential nature of the common
law-this bundle of laws, concepts, and techniques. In its origin, caselaw was
made out of common customs-once they had passed the test of
reasonableness. To an extent, it still is. In a famous set of lectures on the
nature of the judicial process, Justice Benjamin Cardozo explained howjudges
should decide one of those rare cases nowadays of truly "first impression,"
106. JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1987).
107. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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where there is no guiding precedent or binding statute.'08 According to
Cardozo, they should try to figure out what "fair and reasonable men, mindful
of the habits of life of the community, and of the standards of justice and fair
dealing prevalent among them, ought in such circumstances to do."'"° This is
exactly the process by which the common law took shape in the first place
hundreds of years ago.
Caselaw is not like statute law. A precedent can be restated, as the
reason behind the rule becomes clearer-as with the ebb-and-flow test."' °
Public policy can lead to a change in the rule-at first subtle, as with the
trade fixtures exception to the general law of fixtures; later, more far-
reaching. 11' Sometimes a precedent is simply discarded-as with the tort of
loss of consortium. 112 Occasionally, caselaw looks a lot like statute law-as
when abandonment of charitable immunity has only prospective effect. "
Caselaw can trigger changes in statute law-as with the covenant of
habitability in residential leases. 4
Common law interacts with both statutory texts and constitutional texts.
Common law can lend meaning to the terms. But the common law was never
simply a legal dictionary. As we've seen, Jefferson actually thought it would
be dangerous to reduce common law to a text. Once confined, it would cease
to grow. The genius of the common law is to proceed case-by-case and not
try to answer all the questions raised by a particular dispute. The
characteristic common law case involves the question: As between A and B,
who has the better right? That question must be answered, and maybe a few
words (dicta) can be thrown out along the way (obiter) about related
questions. But there is no need to go farther.
Statements of the common law are necessarily only approximations (as
in Steelman)-to be refined later (as in Gwathmey). Although each
restatement may draw closer to the truth, none is ever definitive-as
demonstrated by the successive Restatements of the same bodies of law
periodically issued by the American Law Institute. In fact, the common law
can never be comprehensively stated. This, I think, is its essential character.
It will always be a bit untidy. To return to Oliver Wendell Holmes's
description, it is always adopting new principles at one end and sloughing
them off at the other, and that necessarily involves a certain amount of
108. BENJAMIN CARDOZo, Adherence to Precedent. The Subconscious Element in the
Judicial Process, in NATURE OF JUDICIAL PROCESS 142, 142-43 (1921).
109. Id. at 142.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 45-52.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 54-59.
112. See supra text accompanying note 73.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 77-83.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 84-89.
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inconsistency. 11 5 But, as Holmes warned, the desire for an entirely consistent
legal system is a death wish. An entirely consistent legal system is one that
cannot grow, as ours has and does.
115. See supra text accompanying note 36.
